Instead of Frye's demand for general scientific acceptance, mere "assistance" to the jury is the touchstone of admissibility under Rule 702. 14 Peter Huber, a prominent critic of the federal rules of evidence, coined the phrase "junk science" to describe judicial acceptance of unreliable expert testimony. His book, Galileo s Revenge: junk Science in the Courtroom, sparked a heated debate about the nature and extent of the abuse of science in litigation. 15 Huber's most sensational example of junk science involved a "soothsayer" who "with the backing of expert testimony from a doctor and several police de-14 On June 28, 1993, while this article was in press, the Court decided Daubert v. Me?Tell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 case involving the admissibility of expert testimony in a civil trial. The Court ruled that the Frye test had not survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court, however, also held that scientific evidence must satisfy a reliability text.
Under the Daubert analysis, the trial court must make "a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." In performing this "gatekeeping function," the trial court may consider a number of factors. First, the court should determine whether the scientific theory or technique can be and has been tested. Citing scientific authorities, the Court recognized that a hallmark of science is empirical testing. Second, a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing scientific validity is whether a theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. The peer review and publication process increases the likelihood that flaws in methodology will be detected. Third, a technique's known or potential rate of error is also a relevant factor. Fourth, the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation is another indicium of trustworthiness. Finally, "general acceptance" remains an important consideration. Although the Court rejected "general acceptance" as the sole criterion for admissibility, it recognized its relevance in assessing the reliability of scientific evidence. These factors, however, are neither dispositive nor exhaustive. Indeed, the Court emphasized that the Rule 702 standard is "a flexible one."
A news report on Daubert described the case as "invit [ing] judges to be aggressive in screening out ill-founded or speculative scientific theories." Linda Greenhouse, Peter Huber, 21 HoFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1992) ; Anthony Z. Roisman, Galileo's Revenge: junk Science in the Courtroom, TRIAL, Jan. 1992, at 76 ("Because Galileo 's Revenge is written in an effective, entertaining style, it is particularly dangerous."); Book Note, Rebel ll 'itlzout A Cause, 105 HARV. L. REv. 935 (1992) (reviewing GALILEo's REVENGE: JUNK SciENCE IN THE CouRTROOM) (" [I] t is imperative to disentangle Huber's two criticisms: one evidentiary, against junk science; the other policy-oriented, against modem substantive ton law.").
partment officials" won a million dollar jury award due to the loss of her "psychic powers following a CAT scan." 16 Huber advocates the Frye test as the way to curtail the use ofjunk science. 17 These attacks on scientific evidence have not gone unheeded. Judges now feel compelled to justify their decisions to admit expert testimony by claiming that the evidence "is not junk science' " and that the expert "is no quack." 18 Furthermore, some courts are raising obstacles to the admissibility of scientific evidence. By 1991, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, was prepared to apply the restrictive Frye test to civil cases, a significant departure from prior practice.
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In response to such developments, momentum for reform began with the Civil Rules Committee, which proposed an amendment to Federal Rule 702 ·in 1991. The proposal requires expert testimony to "substantially" assist, rather than merely "assist," the trier of fact, and then only if the testimony is based on "reasonably reliable" information. 20 The last provision apparently embodies a modified Frye rule. 21 The Committee also proposed more expansive discovery of expert testimony in civil cases, including disclosure of a detailed written report "previewing" the expert's testimony. 22 This 16 GALILEo's REVENGE, supra note 15, at 3-4. Vice President Quayle cites this example without including the next sentence. Huber's next sentence is: "The trial judge threw out that verdict." !d. at 4. Instead, the Vice President writes that such stories "are becoming almost commonplace." Dan Quayle, Civil justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 566 ( 1992) . 17 GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 15, at 14, 199.
concurring). One commentator, however, uses Carroll to illustrate unnecessary expert testimony. The plaintiff was injured when an unidentified child pushed the emergency stop button on an escalator. "An 'elevator button expert'-a clinical psychologist -testified that 'red buttons attract small children, this button was unreasonably easy for a child to push, and that a covered stop button is less accessible to children than an uncovered stop button.' " McElhaney, supra note 1, at 21. 24 Once again, expert testimony was targeted. Quayle declared that "it is time to reject the notion that 'junk science' is truly relevant evidence." 25 The Task Force offered its own amendment to Federal Rule 702. It tracked the proposal of the Civil Rules Committee, requiring expert testimony to provide "substantial" assistance to the trier of fact; the Task Force then added two new provisions. First, expert testimony must be "based on a widely accepted explanatory theory." Second, an expert receiving a contingent fee may not testify. 26 Not waiting for the amendment process, former President Bush imposed these requirements on Jd. at 89. The parties must "provide other litigants with a written report from its expert. The report must be detailed and complete-in essence, a preview of the direct testimony from such person, including any exhibits to be used to summarize or support the person's opinions. After the report has been provided, the expert may be deposed . REv. 977 (1992) .
The Task Force prepared a number of documents: (I) proposed amendments to the Federal Rules, (2) the Access to Justice Act of 1992, which was transmitted to Congress, and (3) Despite the highly visible efforts to reform the rules governing experts in the civil arena, the "junk science" debate has all but ignored criminal prosecutions. With one exception, Huber's book focuses on only civillitigation. 30 Similarly, the proposed amendment to Rule 702 was promulgated by the Civil Rules Committee in order to combat perceived abuses in civil trials. The Committee wrote: "Particularly in civil litigation with high financial stakes, large expenditures for marginally useful expert testimony has become commonplace. Procurement of expert testimony is occasionally used as a trial technique to wear down adversaries. " 31 The second sentence of the proposed rule applies only to civil cases: if a party fails to comply with the civil discovery rules, its expert is disqualified. 32 The Quayle proposals are also limited to civil litigation. Indeed, the Supreme Court chose a civil case to decide the Frye issue. 33 This neglect of the problems of expert testimony in criminal 27 Civiljustice Reform, Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991 Moreover, the junk science opponents' failure to deal with criminal prosecutions cannot be explained by differences in the use of expert testimony in civil and criminal cases. 41 Scientific evidence has played a significantly greater role in criminal prosecutions in recent years. DNA profiling is only the latest example. 42 Sophisticated instrumental techniques such as neutron activation analysis, atomic absorption, mass spectrometry, and scanning electron microscopy are common. 43 Other examples include electrophoretic blood testing, voice prints, bite mark comparison, hypnotically refreshed testimony, trace metal detection, voice stress analysis, and horizontal gaze nystagmus. 44 In addition, the use of social science research, often in the form of "syndrome" evidence, has flooded the courts. For example, evidence of rape trauma syndrome, battered wife syndrome, and child abuse accommodation syndrome is now frequently admitted at trial. 45 In addition, the failure to take account of scientific evidence in criminal litigation has led to some remarkable results. While former This essay extends the junk science debate to criminal prosecutions. It examines three issues raised by this debate: (1) the necessity for use of a stringent standard when determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, (2) the need to secure the services of unbiased experts, and (3) the desirability of liberal pretrial discovery of expert testimony.
II. NovEL SciENTIFIC EviDENCE
The impact of "junk science" in criminal cases is poignantly illustrated by Barefoot v. Estelle, 49 the only criminal case that Huber discusses. Thomas Barefoot was convicted of capital murder in Texas. In the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution offered the testimony of two psychiatrists who testified about Barefoot's future dangerousness, a qualifying factor under the Texas death penalty statute. 5° One psychiatrist, Dr. James Grigson, without ever examining Barefoot, testified that there was a " 'one hundred percent and absolute' chance that B·arefoot would commit future acts of criminal violence." 51 Barefoot argued before the Supreme Court that, due to its unreliability, admission of this evidence violated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.
In an amicus brief, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) stated that the "unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the pro- 56 The term "shocks the conscience" was used by Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) , in which the Court condemned the stomach-pumping of a suspect to retrieve evidence. The term is even more apt here. In a scathing dissent in Barefoot, Justice Blackmun wrote:
In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me. One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life is at stake . . . a requirement of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself. 61 It is essentially the same testimony in every case: He'll take the stand, listen to a recitation of facts about the killing and the killer, and then-usually without examining the defendant, without ever setting eyes on him until the day of the trial-tell the jury that, as a matter of medical science, he can assure them the defendant will pose a continuing danger to society as defined by [ 63 See id. at 211 ("And as a bonus for the prosecutors who hire him, the Doctor also does his lethal best to destroy defense attorneys and defense witnesses who challenge him."); id. at 211-12 ("[W] hat makes him popular with prosecutors is that he will go the extra mile; he will go for the jugular to score points to win."); id. at 220 ("The Doctor had told me of the particular relish he has for doing damage on cross-examination. 'I always hold something back for cross,' he said one evening in Lubbock."); id. at 228 ("It seemed to me ... the Doctor brought more than his usual competitive zeal to this casehe brought something extra, an almost personal animus, to the crusade to get Gayland Bradford executed."). ams was subsequently released due to innocence, 67 the Doctor has not changed his mind. According to Grigson, "Adams 'will kill again.' " 6 8 Barifoot cannot be discounted as a "constitutional case" that has limited precedential value in interpreting evidentiary rules. Had the Court relied on some constitutional provision other than the Eighth Amendment, such an argument would have much cogency. The Court's "cruel and unusual punishment" jurisprudence, however, has repeatedly emphasized that a heightened standard of reliability is required when the penalty is death. According to the Court, "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise to a special 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment' in any capital case. " 69 In addition, prosecutors have argued that Barifoot is not limited to constitutional cases. For example, federal prosecutors asserted that Barifoot, not Frye, was the controlling evidentiary standard in United States v. Yee, 70 the first federal case considering the admissibility of the FBI's DNA procedure.
The Bush Administration had it backwards; if there is to be a stringent standard of admissibility, it should be applied in criminal, not civil, cases. The interests involved in criminal and capital prosecutions require a cautious approach, although not necessarily Frye. I have argued elsewhere that prosecutors should be required to satisfy a heavy burden before novel scientific evidence is admitted at trial. 71 Only the government has the resources to commission or 6 7 After an extensive Texas habeas proceeding, in which Adams again claimed his innocence, the judge wrote:
Although the court cannot determine the applicant is "innocent" of the Wood murder ["Since innocence is not a basis in Texas for a new trial ... "], on the basis of the evidence presented at the habeas corpus hearing, applying the law which places the burden of proof on the State beyond a reasonable doubt, the court would have found applicant not guilty at a bench trial. See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) ("The finality of the death penalty requires 'a greater degree of reliability' when it is imposed.") (quoting Lockhart v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (Because the death penalty is different, the Court has "invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination."). 70 The Court in Barefoot justified its lax evidentiary standard, in part, by relying on the adversary system to "uncover, recognize, and take due account of [the] shortcomings" of expert testimony. 73 Determining whether the adversary system is up to this task requires an examination of a number of procedural rules, such as those governing the appointment of defense experts and pretrial discovery. These issues are discussed in the following sections of this article.
III. DEFENSE EXPERTS
The former Vice President's Task Force proposed an amendment to Rule 702, which prohibits the payment of contingent fees to expert witnesses. The prohibition is broadly phrased. An expert is disqualified if any compensation, "directly or indirectly," would vary as a result of the outcome of the case. 74 The rule is intended to preclude the use of biased experts and might even extend to Dr. Grigson, who reportedly earned $200,000 a year from expert-witness fees ($150 an hour) and from a limited private practice .7 5 This proposal, however, does not deal with problems of institutional bias-the control of crime laboratories by the police. 76 Problems in relying on police-controlled crime laboratories have arisen in politically sensitive cases. For example, a federal grand jury investigating the deaths of Black Panther leaders in a police raid reported that the "testimony of the firearms examiner that he could not have refused to sign what he believed was an inadequate and required to establish the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable doubt."). preliminary report on pain of potential discharge is highly alarming. " 77 Similarly, the prosecution of the Maguires as IRA terrorists in Britain rested on evidence that was not only "scientifically false but also known to be by all concerned parties and scientists. " 78 As discussed below, the problem of biased experts, although present in criminal cases, is outweighed by far more serious systemic problems.
A. EXPERT ASSISTANCE FOR INDIGENTS
Those familiar with criminal prosecutions might be bemused by a discussion of the contingent fee issue-not because they favor such fees, but because obtaining the services of any defense expert in criminal litigation is so difficult. Obtaining expert assistance is generally not a problem for the prosecution, which has access to the services of state, county, or metropolitan crime laboratories. In addition, federal forensic laboratories often provide their services to state law enforcement agencies. For example, the services of the FBI Laboratory are available to all duly constituted state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies in the United States.7 9 These services, which are provided without charge, include both the examination of evidence and the court appearance of the expert.
Forensic laboratory services, however, are not generally available to criminal defendants. A survey of approximately 300 crime laboratories revealed that "fifty-seven percent ... would only examine evidence submitted by law enforcement officials. " 80 78 The Maguires were accused of possessing an explosive as part of the IRA's terrorism campaign. The government's case rested on the presence of nitroglycerine on the defendants' fingernails and gloves. Thin layer chromatography was used to detect the nitroglycerine: "The tests were said to be as conclusive and irrefutable as fingerprints. The entire underpinning for this assertion were proved not only to be scientifically false but also known to be by all concerned parties and scientists .... " See James E. Starrs,
The Forensic Scientist and the Open Mind, 31 J. FoRENSIC Sci. Soc'y Ill, 141-42 (1991) (citing May eta!., Interim Report on the Maguire Case, London: HMSO Uuly 12, 1990) In Barefoot, the Court noted that although the accused had not offered the testimony of an opposing expert, there was no claim that the trial court had "refused to provide an expert for petitioner. " 88 Nevertheless, it was not until two years later, in Ake v. Oklahoma, 89 that the Court for the first time recognized a due process right to expert assistance for indigents. Ake's attorney requested a psychiatric evaluation at state expense to prepare an insanity defense. The trial court refused, and although insanity was the only contested issue at trial, no psychiatrist testified on this issue. The Court reversed:
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at A. Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEO. LJ. 1276 , 1278 (1966 (The disparity of investigative resources between the defense and prosecution "is likely to have its maximum impact in the presentation of evidence which must be analyzed and developed in the laboratory or hospital.").
82 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTI-FICATION 49 (1979 Unfortunately, many courts have interpreted Ake restrictively, thereby undercutting its potential as a way of lessening the disparity between prosecution and defense access to expert assistance. For example, some courts have held that "Ake does not reach noncapital cases. "
91 Although Ake involved a capital defendant and Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, 92 attempted to impose a "death penalty" limitation on the right to expert assistance, there is nothing in the majority opinion that supports such a limitation. 93 Indeed, the Court in Little v. Streater, 94 a prior civil case, had ruled that an indigent defendant in a paternity action had the right to a blood grouping test at state expense. Therefore, the "capital trial" limitation appears to be nothing more than a transparent attempt to circumvent Ake.
Other courts limit Ake to psychiatric experts. According to the Alabama Supreme Court, "there is nothing contained in the Ake decision to suggest that the United States Supreme Court was addressing anything other than psychiatrists and the insanity defense. " 95 Consequently, the defendant's request for a forensic pathologist was denied. Here, again, the reach of Ake is artificially restricted. 1240 , 1243 (8th Cir. 1987 ) (en bane) ("Nor do we draw a decisive line for due-process purposes between capital and noncapital cases."), cert. denied, 487 U. S. 1210 (1988) . 92 The Chief justice wrote, "The facts of the case and the question presented confine the actual holding of the Court. In capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protection that may or may not be required in other cases." Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
93 Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, acknowledged that the majority opinion was not so limited. He criticized the majority because "the constitutional rule announced by the Court is far too broad. I would limit the rule to capital cases." Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
452 U.S. I (1981).
95 Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) . Accord Stafford v. Love, 726 P.2d 894, 896 (Okla. 1986); Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986 ) (no right to bloodstain expert) ("Such a risk [of error] in other areas of scientific evidence is not necessarily present because the scientific expert is often able to explain to the jury how a conclusion was reached, the defense counsel can attack that conclusion, and the jury can decide whether the conclusion had a sound basis."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986) . 96 Some courts have ruled that Ake covers nonpsychiatric experts. For example, the Eighth Circuit has ruled that "there is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts. The question in each case must be not what field of science or expert knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the case, and how much help a defense expert could have given." Little v. Armon-While the critical role of psychiatry in insanity defense cases played an important part in the decision, the Court's rationale extends to other types of experts. 97 Experts other than psychiatrists often play pivotal roles in criminal cases-for example, questioned document examiners in forgery cases. 98 Indeed, the Court not only held that Ake had a right to expert assistance in preparing an insanity defense (a trial issue) but also on the issue of "future dangerousness," which was raised in the penalty phase as in Barefoot. 99 Again, Little v. Streater is informative because it involved a blood test in a civil paternity action.
100 Here again, an unjustifiable limitation is used to undercut Ake.
Another post-Ake issue concerns the threshold standard for determining when the appointment of a defense expert is constitutionally required. Unlike the above issues, this one raises a legitimate dispute. According to Ake, the accused must make a "preliminary showing" that expert assistance is "likely to be a significant factor at trial."
101 In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 102 the Court declined to consider a trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics trout, 835 F.2d 1240 trout, 835 F.2d , 1243 trout, 835 F.2d (8th Cir. 1987 ) (en bane) (error to fail to appoint hypnotist), cert. denied, 487 U. S. 1210 (1988) .
See also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308,314 (lOth Cir. 1992) (error to fail to appoint expert on battered woman syndrome); State v. Carmouche, 527 So. 2d 307 (La. 1988) (serologists appointed); State v. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1989 ) (error to fail to appoint fingerprint expert). 97 The commentary to the ABA Standards provide:
[T]he Court's test [in Ake] for access to "basic tools of an adequate defense" has potentially broad application in all contexts regarding the provision of support servIces. The courts of a number of states have recognized a defendant's constitutional right to a broad range of supporting services, including such diverse issues as forensic dental records, fingerprints, firearms, jury selection and demography. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALjUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-1.4 commentary at 23 (3d ed. 1992).
98 As early as 1929, then-Judge Cardozo commented: "[U]pon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or forgery, experts are often necessary both for the prosecution and for defense .... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him. " Reilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929) .
See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 97, at 22 ("The quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet unhelpful to the defendant if his defense requires assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are available.").
99 " [D] ue process requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 (1985) .
100 In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.l (1985) , the Court declined to consider a trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics experts because the defendant had not made a sufficient showing of need. The Court, however, gave no indication that fingerprint or ballistics experts were beyond the scope of Ake.
101 Ake, 470 U.S. at 74. 102 472 U. S. 320 (1985) . experts because the defendant had "offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial." 103 Ake and Caldwell represent the extremes; the former involved compelling facts, while the latter involved the barest of assertions.104 Thus, there is no "bright line test" for determining when the requisite showing has been made. 105 Nevertheless, many courts have required defendants to shoulder near impossible burdens in this context. According to the Eleventh Circuit, a two-pronged test must be satisfied: the defendant must establish a reasonable probability that (1) an expert would be of assistance to the defense and (2) the denial of an expert would result in a fundamentally unfair trial. 106 The second prong erects a substantial barrier, certainly one that the prosecution need not surmount when deciding whether to use expert testimony. To satisfy this burden in a case where the defense seeks to challenge a prosecution expert, the defense "must inform the court of the nature of the prosecution's case and how the requested expert would be useful. At the very least, [counsel] must inform the trial court about the nature of the crime and the evidence linking [the accused] to the crime." 107 As explained below, the lack of adequate discovery often makes this burden impossible to meet. If the threshold standard is set too high, the defendant is placed in a "catch-22" situation, in which the standard "demand[s] that the defendant possess already the expertise of the witness sought." 108 In sum, the promise of Ake remains largely unfulfilled. Criminal Appeals ruled that a defendant was not entitled to the appointment of a defense expert, even though a prosecution expert had testified that the defendant had made the bite mark found on a murder victim. Moreover, the prosecution expert conceded that he had used a novel method of comparison that no one else had ever used, and he also testified that only "one in a billion people" had a particular characteristic shared by the defendant. 112 The basis for this astounding statistic is not revealed and is suspect.
Another bite mark case, Harrison v. State, 113 involved the death penalty for the murder of a ten year-old girl. A prosecution expert testified that the defendant had bit the victim more than forty times, but the trial court nevertheless rejected a defense request for an expert. To demonstrate a "particularized need" for a defense expert, the trial judge required that the expert first review the evidence and write an affidavit. Without pay, however, most experts will not review the evidence nor prepare an affidavit. By the time of the appeal, an expert had been found, and he concluded that the "marks were not from bites."II 4
Revisited: Expert Psychiatn·c Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach For the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REv. 763,769 ( 1990) ("Lower courts often have interpreted Ake less than generously, unduly constricting the availability of the right.").
110 For a discussion of bite mark evidence, see I GIANNELLI & lMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, ch. 13.
Ill 836 P.2d 673 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). 112 The prosecution's expert testified that:
[H]e used two types of analyses to identify appellant as the assailant: bitemark/dentition comparison and a comparison of microorganisms found in the wound and in appellant's mouth. The doctor placed primary identification emphasis on the microorganism "aspergillus" being present in both the bitemark and in appellant's mouth. At trial the doctor testified that aspergillus would be found in the mouths of only "one in a billion people." Although the doctor claimed that his tests were "accepted," he admitted that he was .aware of no other persons who either used or advocated the use of microbiological analysis in bitemark compari- "In recent DNA cases in Oklahoma and Alabama, the defense did not retain any experts, because the presiding judge had refused to authorize funds." 119 In addition, a 1992 study of indigent defense systems noted that the "greatest disparities occur in the areas of investigators and expert witnesses, with the prosecutors possessing more resources."l2o
In sum, the problem of "contingent fee" experts seems rather minor when compared to a death penalty case without any expert to rebut the prosecution's scientific evidence.
IV. DISCOVERY
The junk science opponents also advocate expanded pretrial discovery of expert testimony as a way to ferret out bad science. Former Vice President Quayle asserted that:
More comprehensive inquires should be permitted of proposed 'expert' witnesses through interrogatories and depositions .... Litigants should be able to scrutinize experts by obtaining more information about them. To this end, disclosure of additional core data should be required-namely, a list of the expert's publications and a description of the expert's compensation arrangement-without cost to the opposing party. 121 At the same time that the former Vice President was trumpeting the virtues of expanded discovery in civil litigation, federal prosecutors were opposing discovery in the first major DNA case using the FBI procedure. In United States v. Yee, 122 the government opposed discovery of matching criteria, environmental insult studies, popula-tion data, and proficiency tests. 123 In contrast, the National Academy of Sciences DNA report unequivocally recommends extensive discovery.124
In addition, the former Vice President was apparently unaware that the information he sought disclosed in civil trials was typically not subject to discovery in criminal litigation. 125 Indeed, criminal discovery does not even match what was available under the current civil rule, the one Quayle found so deficient. Typically, there are no discovery depositions or interrogatories in criminal prosecutions, 126 and in many jurisdictions, the defense does not have a right to a list of the prosecution witnesses, including experts. 127
The most common discovery provision in criminal litigation concerns scientific reports. There is, however, often no requirement that a report be prepared, and oral reports may not be discoverable.128 Consequently, the defense may not learn that a prosecution expert will testify until that expert takes the stand at trial. Moreover, the typical lab report is grossly inadequate-often providing only a "summary of the results of an unidentified test conducted by an anonymous technician." 129 For example, a report containing the results of a gunshot residue test may not specify the methodology used-for example, neutron activation analysis, atomic absorption, the paraffin test, scanning electron microscopy, or another technique. Some of these procedures are valid, but 123 The U.S. Magistrate eventually ruled in favor of the defense, but had to resort to a creative interpretation of Criminal Rule 16, the federal discovery provision, to reach this result. The discovery argument initially focused on whether these documents were discoverable scientific reports within the meaning of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D). The magistrate ultimately ruled these documents were "predicate materials" under FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(C), which governs the inspection of documents and tangible objects. !d. at 635.
124 "The prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully to defense counsel and experts retained by the defendant all material that might be necessary in evaluating the evidence." NAT'L REs. CouNCIL, supra note 119, at 145. others are not. 130 In addition, the qualifications of the expert, the ultimate conclusion reached, 131 and the bases for the conclusion typically are not reported. Other important documents, such as bench notes 132 and graphs, 133 may not be subject to discovery.
Finally, none of the typical reasons for distinguishing civil and criminal discovery apply in this context. 134 The ABA Standards note: "The need for full and fair disclosure is especially apparent with respect to scientific proof and the testimony of experts .... [I] t is virtually impossible for evidence or information of this kind to be distorted or misused because of its advance' disclosure." 135 An amendment to Criminal Rule 16, currently under consideration, would rectify most the problems discussed in this section. The amendment reads:
(E) Expert Witnesses: At the defendant's request, the government shall disclose to the defendant a written summary of testimony the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case in chief at trial. This summary must describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and the reasons therefor, and the witnesses' qualifications. 136 The junk science opponents played no part in the promulgation of this amendment. 137 Instead, the Bush administration advocated ex-pansive discovery in civil cases, and opposed discovery in the DNA cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The "junk science" debate and the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert have cast a spotlight on the problems associated with the use of expert testimony and scientific evidence. Unfortunately, the criminal side of the docket has remained in the shadows. It is time to shift the spotlight.
The use of scientific evidence in criminal trials should be encouraged. It is often better than other types of evidence typically used in criminal prosecutions-for example, eyewitness testimony. The present adversary system, however, does not contain sufficient safeguards to protect against the misuse of scientific evidence. There is a critical need for a heightened standard which demands demonstration of reliability before novel scientific evidence is admitted in criminal trials. A better system for providing defense experts also must be developed. Finally, criminal discovery should be expanded; the proposed amendment to Federal Criminal Rule 16 is an important step in the right direction.
Criminal Discovery, 67 N.C. L. REv. 577, 622 (I989). The other article cited by the advisory committee was Giannelli, supra note I25.
The problems of discovery of scientific evidence were discussed earlier in Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, IOI F.R. D. 599 (1983) , which included Paul C. Giannelli, Observations on Discovery of Scientific Evidence, IO I F.R.D. 622 (1983) , and James E. Starrs, Comments on Discovery and Its Application to the Lindbergh Kidnapping Case, I 0 I F.R. D. 625 (1983) .
